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Abstract 
As the international standards OHSAS 18001 and ISO 31000 bear witness, interest in safety 
management is growing worldwide. At the same time, it is becoming more and more complex, which 
has led to increasing reliance on procedures. On the one hand, control procedures are embodied in 
inspection services, who are gaining in knowledge and experience and creating frameworks and tools. 
These changes have provided a better understanding and definition of the role and responsibilities of 
inspectors in compliance control. On the other hand, industries need to adapt to cultural and technical 
changes resulting from economic needs. The complexity of the situation has led industries to adopt 
management tools; amongst them new, but promising software packages. Decision support systems 
are growing in popularity with safety stakeholders. Feedback, indicators, monitoring: the toolbox 
continues to expand. At the same time, the information that is shared is expanding. Our work relates 
to the regulation process: do enhanced legal powers lead to improved control? Improvements in safety 
require a virtuous relationship between stakeholders and improved communication. This article looks 
in detail at the role of occupational health and safety inspectors in France and their relationships with 
industrial partners. 
 
Keywords: Inspection – Control – Actor-Network theory – Social regulation theory – Nuclear safety – 
Industrial safety 
Introduction 
On 21 September 2001 a disaster occurred at the AZF fertiliser factory in Toulouse, France. 
Inspection reports
1
 stated that the hangar in which the explosion occurred did not comply 
with chemical industry regulations in force at the time. In its judgment of 24 January 2013, 
the Administrative Court of Appeal of Bordeaux acknowledged, for the first time in France, 
that the State was partially responsible. Over and above the legal implications, this ruling 
raised questions about the limitations of the control model of safety. Classically, safety is 
guaranteed by safety management systems (Cambon et al., 2006) that are developed by 
businesses, and legal provisions that are enforced by State entities. Typically, this 
relationship manifests in various processes (such as regulatory monitoring and legal 
compliance) and inspections. 
Inspections, which are one of the founding principles for the control of industrial 
installations, mobilize various human and non-human actors (Law, 1992). The considerable 
progress made in information technology and communication has led to the emergence of 
“non-human” actors in the form of databases, decision support software, and more recently, 
communication and collaborative solutions with high added value.  
The “system of actors” has therefore become both more extensive and more complicated.  
Consequently, a characterization of the relationships and interactions between human actors, 
non-human actors, and human and non-human actors merits close analysis.  
In this study we focus on the French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l'énergie 
atomique et aux énergies alternatives, CEA) to characterize this complexity. The CEA is a 
longstanding member of the French nuclear community. In addition to its inspection 
responsibilities (nuclear security, occupational health and safety, and environment), it lies at 
the crossroads between central government, which is driven by political and industrial 
imperatives (Foasso, 2010) and local facilities that must respond to technical and scientific 
requirements, and human and organizational needs (workers, suppliers, local residents), 
which are distributed across the country. In practice the CEA has two hats: it is both 
“controlled” and it is the “controller”. The latter role is equally important in terms of internal 
(the State and accredited bodies) and external (IGN, CSNSQ
2
) controls.  
This paper begins with a general typology of stakeholders and their organization. Next, the 
theoretical framework is described in detail in order to integrate it into the framework of our 
work and with the aim of modelling collaboration between actors. Finally we analyse our 
initial, exploratory field interviews, which demonstrate how a collaborative management 
software platform is used in the actor network. 
 
                                                             
1
 Inspection reports from December 2001–February 2002 concerning the accident at the AZF Grande Paroisse 
factory in Toulouse on 21 September 2001.  
2
 The General and Nuclear Inspectorate (Inspection Générale et Nucléaire, IGN) and the Nuclear Security, 
Safety and Quality Unit (Cellule de Sûreté Nucléaire Sécurité et Qualité, CSNSQ) are the internal CEA organs 
(central and local, respectively) responsible for the supervision and control of nuclear safety and security. 
1. The controller/ controlled relationship: current practice  
Classically, the actors involved in nuclear control activities are divided into internal and 
external stakeholders. In this section, In order to organize and classify the actors, we rely on 
the Chiapello (1996) typology of control process. It permits to categorize the principal actors 
involved in control into four subsystems: self-regulation, internal inspection, external 
agencies and State inspectors. 
1.1 The CEA 
French risk prevention regulations define the obligations of employers and operators. These 
obligations, which relate to the fields of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS), the 
environment, and nuclear safety, require operators to have a good understanding of the 
regulatory framework. They must both meet regulatory requirements
3
 and ensure that they 
are followed in the field.  
Most CEA centres have been awarded triple certification: ISO 9001 (quality management), 
OHSAS 18001 (occupational health and safety) and ISO 14001 (environmental 
management). In order to meet the requirements of the French government and international 
standards, the CEA’s central administration has developed a Quality, Safety and Environment 
policy, which is supported by an internal Risk Management Department (Pôle de Maîtrise 
des Risques). The policy is based on the following safety standards: 
 Design of facilities must adhere to strict rules.  
 Construction must meet the highest quality standards and include multiple control 
checks.  
 Rigorous, programmed maintenance schedules that incorporate significant safety 
margins with respect to the failure of materials.  
 A prudent approach to operations, framed by clearly specified rules,  
 Periodic re-evaluations of safety, leading to action plans that reflect the most recent 
safety standards. 
The CEA must be able to respond to a wide variety of risks. This high level of vulnerability 
has prompted the deployment of a complex safety management system (SMS) that comprises 
internal experts and external service providers. The semi-exploratory interviews that we 
carried out with members of the various inspection services made it possible to establish an 
overview of the actors involved in nuclear control (Figure 1).  
                                                             
3
 Act No. 2003–699 of 30/07/03 relating to the prevention of technological and natural risks and compensation 
for any damage. 
 Figure 1 Overall organization of CEA controls 
The overall system is divided into two subsystems: internal controls (consisting of self-
regulation and inspection/ internal audit procedures), and external accredited bodies 
(consisting of control agencies). 
The work of Audiffren et al. (2012) and in particular a survey conducted in 2009 and 2010 by 
Audiffren et al. (2013) characterized the internal actors involved in the SMS: the “prevention 
specialists”. Despite the diversity of job titles (e.g. “safety officer”, “safety manager” or even 
“QSE officer”), a clear typology emerged (Table 1).  
Table 1 Typology of OHS professionals (Audiffren et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 2 makes it possible to compare this typology with the CEA’s mode of operation. 
 Figure 2 A typology of internal CEA OHS actors 
The CEA shares the commitment to safety culture that is typically found in the nuclear 
sector. Each worker is a “ground-level” actor. OHS “fieldworkers” work in the safety and 
security services at facilities and are responsible for internal self-regulation. OHS “managers” 
are responsible for internal audits and inspections; they work at managerial level at sites and 
in the CEA’s Risk Management Department, which is under the control of the central 
administration. 
1.1.1 Self-regulation 
The head of a facility (the facility director) holds delegated authority from the site director; 
this delegation confers authority to decide and execute the actions needed to ensure risk 
management at the facility and all other areas of safety.  
Support is provided by the facility’s OHS unit. This is composed of engineers (OHS 
fieldworkers, as described in Audiffren et al., 2013), who are responsible for local controls. 
The main responsibility of the facility director is to provide Level 1 controls, which involves 
verification that the facility complies with regulations, and the management of safety and 
security. The service is guided by recommendations provided by OHS managers and CEA 
best practice
4
. It represents the front line of safety, and is subject to both internal (IGN, 
CSNSQ) and external (ASN
5
, DREAL
6
, control agency) inspections.  
In order to meet these internal and external requirements, the OHS unit is responsible for 
local self-regulation. This involves the following processes: 
                                                             
4
 General Rules of Operation (Règles Générales d’Exploitation): the CEA’s internal guide to operations and best 
practice.  
5
 The Nuclear Security Authority (Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire) is an inspection agency responsible for nuclear 
security. 
6
 The Regional Directorate of Environment, Planning and Housing (Direction Régionale de l’Environnement, de 
l’Aménagement et du Logement) is a decentralized state service responsible for the inspection of classified 
installations. 
 Regulatory monitoring (internal, international and legal standards).  
 Local compliance assessments.  
 Planning of remedial actions. 
 Management of priorities. 
The distinctive feature of the unit is that it is close to the situation on ground and has 
considerable expertise. As it is centralizes the facility’s technical, human and organizational 
knowledge, it is also an asset in dealing with the various State inspectors and auditors. It 
constitutes the initial point of contact with external agencies and is able to respond in many 
different ways. For example, one facility has designed and developed a computerized system 
for monitoring actions to be taken in cases of non-compliance with regulatory requirements.  
However, the effectiveness of self-regulation often depends on the quality of the relationship 
between OHS professionals and the operator on the one hand, and between OHS 
professionals and the facility’s inspector on the other. 
Figure 3 shows how self-regulation can be organized within a facility. 
 
 
Figure 3 Self-regulation within a facility 
1.1.2 Internal inspection  
Internal inspections are carried out by the CEA’s central administration represented by the 
PMR (in particular the IGN) and OHS managers at the facility. It operates at two levels of 
control:  
 Level 1: a physical inspection of facilities and activities (IGN).  
 Level 2: an evaluation of the SMS (verification of processes and documentation). 
Interlocutors include the site director, the facility manager and its OHS mangers and units. 
The exercise consists of an inspection and audits prepared by the central administration 
carried out by the actors listed above, and internal audits prepared by OHS managers. In both 
cases, they are based on feedback from the field (local expressions of needs) and the broad 
headings found in international standards (measurement, continuous improvement, etc.). This 
makes it possible to verify compliance with the facility’s safety and security policy and 
suggest improvements in response to feedback that is shared with other sites.  
However, the actors involved in these internal controls report that not all information is 
shared. While the audits that are carried out by OHS managers are welcomed and enable open 
and honest discussion, the stakes are high in PMR inspections (which are viewed in the same 
way as State inspections), and discussion is strictly limited to meeting the demands of 
inspectors. 
 
 
Figure 4 The organization of internal controls 
1.1.3 Non-State control agencies 
Inspection services can share their workload with accredited organizations such as control, 
consultancy and advisory agencies. These agencies provide corporate clients with expertise 
that is deployed directly on-site by specialized professionals in order to carry out various 
checks (fire extinguishers, equipment compliance, etc.). This “audit” is carried out by an 
external expert who is accredited by the French Accreditation Committee (Comité Français 
d’Accréditation, COFRAC) and it is another key process. It consists of the “verification and 
assessment of all aspects of a structure, an organization or a system” (Dictionary of the 
Environment). Its objective is to highlight “non-compliance with standards or regulatory 
requirements” and “the strengths and weaknesses of the company’s approach to occupational 
risk prevention” (Esen Education7).  
These control agency auditors contribute significant expertise in the investigative techniques 
(field visits, interviews, reviews of documentation) deployed in an audit (Innes, 2009). They 
are involved in both regulatory compliance assessments (e.g. for classified installations) and 
normative audits (e.g. compliance with ISO 14001
8
). Consequently, they are seen as external 
experts whose opinion on the operation of the facility is both valued and respected. 
Nevertheless, OHS units and facility directors do not share any more information with them 
than with internal auditors. 
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 Source: Ministry of National Education (Ministère de l’éducation nationale) website. 
8
 http://www.boutique-certification.afnor.org/ 
There is one more external participant whose opinion can create problems for the facility.  
1.1.4 State inspectors 
1.1.4.1 Current State inspections 
Safety controls are the primordial responsibility of State inspection services. These entities 
work with accredited organizations that provide complementary services or have other 
responsibilities delegated to them by the State; they can also carry out internal controls.  
Our study looks at three specific inspections that apply to the nuclear industry:  
 Inspectors of Classified Installations; 
 Labour Inspectors; and 
 Nuclear Inspectors. 
Figure 5 shows how these three services are organized, from national to local level:  
 
 
Figure 5: The organization of State inspections in France 
Inspections are carried out nationwide and are the responsibility of both the central 
administration and decentralized services. Policies are defined at national level and integrate 
local-level feedback that contributes to centralized procedures which are deployed according 
to local needs. They are framed by a multi-year national strategic plan, which is divided into 
yearly national actions applied to regions. These inspections share several responsibilities:  
 specification of the regulatory framework; 
 monitoring of companies; and 
 public information. 
These principal responsibilities of each inspectorate are complemented by specific 
responsibilities that apply to individual inspection services: 
 Labour Inspectorate: provision of advice to business, the fight against black-market 
work, accident inquiries. 
 Inspectorate of Classified Installations: accident inquiries, complaint management.  
 Nuclear Inspectorate: monitoring of significant events involving radiation. 
Nuclear inspectors in particular benefit from a number of prerogatives:  
 Unannounced and unimpeded visits at any time
9
. 
 The right of immediate access to all mandatory documentation.  
 The right to interview any employee/ manager/ director with respect to any legal 
provision. 
As for the Labour Inspectorate, it has an arsenal of punitive measures to facilitate its work:  
 Procès-verbaux (official reports of observed offences)  
 Mises en demeure (time-limited enforcement notices that are issued by the inspector 
or the regional director as provided for by the French Labour Code)  
1.1.4.2 Changes in inspection practice 
The current form of inspections in the civilian nuclear sector finds its origins in a Napoleonic 
decree of 1810 on polluting sites
10
. The regulation of industrial facilities came about through 
a “combination of competing interests” (Bonnaud 2002, p.177), at a time when it did not 
make sense to distinguish between industrial development and inspection. This combination 
of liberalism and State intervention has guided regulation, which supports development 
through the implementation of best practices (Bonnaud, 2002, p.178). Initially, the role of the 
inspector was entrusted to the municipal police force and concerned the maintenance of 
public order under the supervision of the préfet (the appointed local representative of the 
State). 
During the nineteenth century, safety at classified installations was perceived primarily in 
terms of public health. The responsibilities of inspectors tended to focus on hygiene
11
. At this 
time, inspectors were mainly recruited from the medical world (doctors, pharmacists, etc.) 
and there were few technical experts (e.g. from the Ministries of Industry, Bridges and 
Highways) (Bonnaud 2002, p.186).  
Inspection procedures for classified installations were formalized at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The principle of the inspection visit was established, and a body of 
professional experts responsible for their inspection appeared. This came under the 
responsibility of the Labour Inspectorate (Act of 2 November 1892) immediately after the 
First World War (Act of 19 December 1917). This change made it possible for the State to 
take full control of industrial practices and to homogenize them at the national level.  
In 1966, a catastrophe at the Feyzin refinery near Lyon in France highlighted two weaknesses 
of the system: the lack of technical knowledge of labour inspectors and regulations that had 
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 Inspections of classified and nuclear installations: Article L.514-5 of the Environmental Code. 
10
 Decree on troublesome or dangerous factories and sweatshops, 15 October 1810 
11
 Letter from the Parisian Préfet of Police to the Préfet of the Rhone, 20 November 1821 
not kept pace with industrial practice (Bonnaud, 2002, p 255.). Consequently, responsibility 
for the inspection of classified installations was handed to the Ministry of Industry. This 
transfer led to the embodiment of responsibility for technical, administrative and legal issues 
in a single person: the inspector. It also enhanced the legitimacy of the actions of inspectors 
of classified installations and left labour inspectors to focus on their priority, the health and 
safety of workers. 
At the same time, the emergence of military and civilian nuclear energy led to the creation of 
a new profession: the inspector of nuclear installations. It should be noted that given the 
specificities of the nuclear sector, some occupational health and safety obligations were 
transferred from the labour inspectorate to the nuclear inspectorate, resulting in joint 
inspections and the transfer of skills and knowledge.  
Although the three inspection services share a common origin, it is important to note the 
significant cultural difference between labour inspectors and inspectors of classified and 
nuclear installations. In the latter services “technical” inspectors share the same industrial 
engineering background, which means that personnel often move between them. This 
similarity was highlighted by the Feyzin disaster. The “new” inspectors of classified facilities 
based their relationship with the industry on technical issues, unlike the legal approach taken 
by the Labour Inspectorate (Bonnaud, 2002, p. 255).  
2. Framework  
We based our work on a theoretical base and the use of a society platform. We selected two 
major sociological theories in order to analyse and understand the interactions between the 
actors involved in control activities: actor-network theory (ANT) and social regulation theory 
(SRT). The former makes it possible to analyse the broader organization in terms of technical 
objects (human or non-human actors). The latter makes it possible to better understand the 
relationship between external and self-regulation. The management tool choose has improve 
a ten years assessment in various industrial fields (Energy, transport, aeronautic, petroleum, 
etc…) and propose an adaptable framework which permit the creation of a specific tool for 
the experimentation. 
2.1 Theoretical base 
2.1.1 Actor-network theory 
Various authors (Latour, 1991; Callon, 1991; Law, 1992) have investigated the influence of 
the technical object on its environment (geographical, political, social, etc.). Madeleine 
Akrich (1991) studied the influence of human and non-human actors on each other. From this 
perspective the technical object is not passive, but instead participates in the creation of the 
socio-economic-technical system (Law, 1992). The distinguishing feature of ANT is that it 
sees both human and non-human stakeholders as equal, and actors communicate via a 
“translation centre”.  
The relationship between controllers and the controlled, which combines physical 
characteristics and forms of usage (Akrich, 1996) is rooted in this framework. As Lascoumes 
(2004) points out, the focus is not on theories, but the instruments and devices that they give 
rise to. In other words, it is tools (“technical objects”) that enable the management of nuclear 
safety, notably with respect to radiation protection. 
The concept of “Punctualization” (Law, 1992) is useful in clarifying the system of actors. 
Actors are defined as local networks that are transformed into “black boxes” in the form of 
irreducible resources in order to improve the creation of the network in question. For 
example, increasing reliance on procedures leads to greater weight being given to legal, 
technical and accounting provisions and a generalization of norms and standards, which can 
be grouped under the heading “regulation”.  
The heterogeneity of actors creates a need for translation (Callon, 1986). Translation centres 
undertake the work of making the network intelligible. For example, the profusion of 
regulations has led to the development of management tools (Moisdon, 2005) that represent 
“arrangements” for people and “objects”. These tools make it possible to highlight the 
different dynamics at work in “orienting” the network (Law, 1992). Actors and organizations 
“translate” parts of the network in order to orient it towards their “aspirations”. Translation is 
also therefore a way to exercise power and is seen, for example, in the interpretation of 
regulatory texts by inspectors according to the situation. 
ANT highlights three safety actor profiles: 
 People: meaning both physical human beings and their skills and ability to adapt 
(Sonntag, 2007). Consequently, an engineer who is an OHS manager is both an 
facility auditor and an IGN controller.  
 Materials: represented by measuring instruments, regulatory texts, etc. Materials can 
direct the way in which people behave (Akrich, 1987). At the CEA for example, 
legislation is translated by a dedicated service which aims to provide operational 
guidance to OHS professionals. However, this translation centre lacks resources, and 
it has become necessary to have a further translation of the actors involved in “legal 
regulation” and “normative regulation” in order to keep up to date. 
 Management tools: these are innovative technical objects used to analyse the 
requirements of authorities that are phrased in terms of controls.  
Information technology is widely used by stakeholders who use it rationalize and justify their 
actions. These “mental prosthesis” (as they were termed by Moisdon, 2005), are targeted at 
the level of the system and form an integral part of an ongoing process of “governmentality”. 
For example, the CEA has developed a nationwide management tool in the form of an 
intranet that brings together and centralizes information about each site and each of its 
facilities. 
These tools can also improve collaboration between controllers and controlled. Bollecker 
(2003) argues that the outcome of controls depends first and foremost on a mutual 
understanding of the benefits. When performance is linked to objectives that include control 
criteria, efficiency is guaranteed. The design, development and use of these technical objects 
is therefore paramount in order to ensure effective controls and enhance interactions between 
actors.  
The correct translation of the aspirations of people via management tools operates through 
four fundaments:  
 Sustainable: the need for sustainable actors (e.g. regulations).  
 Mobile: the need for mobile actors (e.g. inspectors or OHS specialists).  
 Anticipation: the need for responsive translation centres and alert actors (e.g. through 
regulatory monitoring processes).  
 Strategy: the need for “visionary” and well-organized actors (e.g. SMS).  
In the nuclear context, a number of specialized management tools with varying capabilities 
have emerged in the areas of OHS, the environment and nuclear safety (Vigneron et al., 
2013). 
 Simple regulatory monitoring (public structures, publishers of legal information). 
 Consulting (control or advisory agencies).  
 In-house solutions (internal information systems). 
 Specialised publishers (integrated health, safety and environment performance 
management tools including assessment and reporting tools, action plans and 
performance indicators).  
2.2.1 Social regulation theory 
If ANT laid the groundwork for the system of actors, social regulation theory (SRT) provides 
a better understanding of the interactions between them. It argues that any organization is 
governed by regulations (de Terssac, 2003, p.10): regulatory controls on the one hand and 
self-regulation on the other, which cohabit via negotiations that lead to joint regulation 
(Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 Model of joint regulation (Revue française de gestion, 2008/3 n° 183) 
Regulation is mainly used as a normative concept (de Terssac, 2003): in other words, 
adjustments to rules (injunctions, prohibitions) act as an organizing principle (Reynaud, 
2005) This approach to safety management is partially based on the argument put forward by 
March and Simon (1958) that actions do not flow naturally from rules. Similarly, 
organizations are not regulated by a single optimal rationality. Instead, there is an ongoing 
process of adaptation centred on interactions between regulatory controls on the one hand 
(the State, central administration, management) and autonomous regulation (decentralized 
State services, executive agencies, subsidiaries, etc.) on the other.  
Here, we focus specifically on regulations that are designed to manage interactions between 
control organizations (internal or external) and those they control (who may themselves be 
controllers). 
Control begins with legal provisions put in place by the State and self-regulation. 
Consequently, as Jammaud (2003) underlines, there is a plurality of sources of rules that are 
not only legal or statutory. For example, the CEA must comply with both external 
regulations, and its own General Operating Rules. During an inspection the two sets of 
regulations (external and internal) are harmonised through a mutual adjustment process 
(letters detailing corrective actions to be undertaken known as lettres de suite) leading to a 
negotiated compromise (Reynaud, 2005) and joint regulation (the operating license).  
Rules are adjusted by each party via adaptation mechanisms, notably through demonstrated 
respect for effective compliance (de Terssac, 2013). The process takes into account how 
regulations are actually applied in the field (Alter, 2003), for example during site visits by 
State entities, and the implementation of their recommendations. Effective respect requires 
the implementation of the usage rules proposed by de Terssac (2013). It reflects the ability of 
managers (Amblard et al., 2005) to mobilize stakeholders, notably through reciprocal 
requirements, in order to legitimize their actions (the rule of engagement). Then they must 
convert passive stakeholders into proactive actors (Morel et al., 2008) (the rule of ownership). 
This step requires adaptation to safety rules: it is the outcome of negotiations (control and 
safety rules) and relevant know-how (self-regulation). The third step concerns learning by 
doing (the rule of understanding). An example of this is feedback processes (Morel, 2009) 
that are free from sanction. The last step focuses on increasing the maturity of the system. It 
concerns the ability of each actor to support the development of regulations (the rule of 
confrontation), for example through roundtable discussions, or internal practices such as 
“safety Tuesdays” suggested by some inspection services. This brings us to the question of 
the integration of an ongoing, endemic improvement process (Blazsin et al., 2013), which 
could perhaps be called a safety culture (Lefranc et al., 2012). Complex systems such as the 
CEA consist of multiple sets of regulations that interact and provide a shared system of 
negotiated rules – a process that promotes more effective safety management.  
ANT provides an insight into the mutual influence of human and non-human actors in a 
complex socio-technical system such as the CEA. Coupled with SRT, it offers a way to 
describe and analyse the network of actors that are stakeholders in the control process. Figure 
7 provides an initial overview of their respective contributions. 
 Figure 7 SRT – ANT model 
2.3 Implementation and modelling 
 The work carried out by Audiffren et al. (2013) on safety compliance and that of Lefranc et 
al. (2012) on safety culture contribute to our modelling approach. As the control relationship 
is intimately linked to the question of compliance, the normative compliance models 
developed by Audiffren and Lefranc provide a starting point for our model. The quantitative 
survey conducted by Audiffren et al. (2013) highlighted a number of issues related to 
corporate management systems; in particular the importance of compliance to the 
optimization of safety. 
The model is based on the typology of models developed by Le Moigne (1987). Specifically, 
we selected a prescriptive normative model, which provides an ideal representation of the 
system of actors. Following Walliser (1977), general expectations are based on the objectives 
to be achieved: here, radiation protection management and the use of a collaborative platform 
between actors needed to achieve this goal. 
The role of inspectors is to identify divergences from a given repository and the company’s 
SMS is used to implement the measures necessary for compliance management. 
In the following sections, we present the key compliance processes suggested by Audiffren et 
al. (2012). We model exchanges between actors involved in radiation protection control 
(inspectors, the CEA and the collaborative platform). The two main human actors in this 
process were identified by Audiffren et al. (2012) as the “prevention manager” and the 
“prevention fieldworker”. Figure 9 suggests the links between the human and non-human 
actors. 
 Figure 89 Legal compliance management (Audiffren et al., 2012) 
The software tool acts as a relay and a central point to store information. Thus, the two 
human actors involved in control (the prevention manager and the fieldworker) can use it to 
communicate.  
However, Audiffren and Lefranc’s work was limited to internal management systems and 
focuses on a single control process (compliance). Our study includes external control actors 
and an objective (radiation protection safety management), i.e. the effectiveness of 
compliance regulations controlled by the inspection process. 
Classically, the inspection and control process is based on an assessment of compliance with 
regulations. Here we focus on the support that can be provided by collaborative software. 
Specifically, we look at software solutions from specialized publishers such as the company 
Preventeo (a partner in this research). The following sub-processes can be identified 
(Audiffren et al., 2013, Lefranc et al., 2013):  
1) Company configuration 
2) legal measurement 
3) practice measurement 
4) Management, 
5) publication of data and knowledge bases 
 
 Figure 98 Compliance management sub-processes (Audiffren et al., 2012) 
Each of these sub-processes corresponds to a module in the Preventeo
 
platform.  
The first module, “organization” (1) concerns how the business is organized.. The 
“organization” module centralizes all the information generated by the software package.  
Each part of the organization is able to monitor applicable regulatory texts via the “regulatory 
monitoring” module (2). The regulatory scope applicable to each business unit is divided into 
three areas: OHS, Environment and Nuclear.  
Once the scope has been determined (with the help of the regulatory monitoring module), it 
can be evaluated in detail via the “compliance assessment” (2) module. This aims to create a 
detailed assessment of compliance based on classical audit techniques (Innes, 2009) and 
improve the quality of associated reporting (compliance reports).  
On the other hand, the “feedback” and “risk assessment” modules (3) allow taking a closer 
look to the real deal inside the organization. These “company practice measurement” tools 
provide internal information about the safety management. 
The results of the compliance assessment are centralized in a fourth module dedicated to the 
daily monitoring and management of action plans (4). OHS managers and the IGN can use 
this module to manage internal CEA action plans and suggest additions resulting from 
requests from inspection services and comments from accredited bodies. 
The knowledge bases and assessment questionnaires that make up the monitoring and 
compliance assessment (2) modules are created using a fifth module called the “knowledge 
base editor” (5). This module enables the creation of legal, normative or internal databases. 
The editor makes it possible to divide texts into requirements, which then take the form of 
audit questions. 
The previous elements allow us to gave a more accurate view of the interactions between the 
safety stakeholders and the place of a collaborative platform as a management tool in the 
control relation. 
 
 
3. Results and discussion  
In order to organize and classify the interactions between the stakeholders by the 
collaborative platform, we categorize the flow of their interaction with the management tool. 
3.1 Initial results 
The value of our work lies in the ability to understand the interactions and aspirations of each 
actor. It provides a neutral space for discussion leading to mutual support in order to fulfil 
shared safety goals and meet each actor’s objectives. The typology of actors provides an 
initial representation of a control process that integrates a collaborative dimension. We 
illustrate the process through the role played by a collaborative software tool implemented at 
a facility.  
The first step was to define the system of actors likely to contribute to the inputs of the 
software platform. Figure 10 shows these contributors. 
 
 
Figure 10 Collaborative control platform, contributors 
This representation highlights the contributors of management tools in all stakeholders. There 
is two kinds of them: direct and indirect ones. The first ones upload directly the input in the 
platform, instead of the other ones whom gave information but don’t upload them to the 
platform (as a free download platform who provide information but don’t analyse them). As 
we can observe, the direct contributors are internal (company OHS managers and 
fieldworkers) and the indirect ones are mostly external (inspectors and the testing companies) 
but also internal (HSE officer). It is completed by an analysis of the stakeholders’ users of the 
outputs (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 platform users 
As for the contributors, this figure proposes two categories of users: direct and indirect. First 
ones take the outputs directly from the platform, instead of the indirect users which rely on 
the direct users to get information. As we can observe, the direct users internal (company 
OHS managers and fieldworkers) and the indirect ones are the mostly external (inspectors 
and the testing companies) but also internal (HSE officer). 
Theses two schemes provide a lot of information about HOW information around the 
platform are used. The next figure will provide information about WHICH information are 
uploaded/downloaded on the management tool (figure 12): 
 
Figure 12 inputs/outputs sharing 
This scheme figure out information provide to the platform (inputs) and ones get in return 
(outputs). It is completed by a categorization between information shared or unshared by the 
stakeholders. As we can see shared information relies on legal information. Others 
information aren’t shared. 
3.2 Discussion 
As say in the introduction, these results are based on initial, exploratory field interviews. 
They focus on two data: contributors/ users stakeholders and inputs/outputs. They allow to 
see the network organization with the management tool as a centre. 
Of course, we have to stay cautious with the results. The actual actor network doesn’t 
represent the platform builders and their role in the indirect data inputs collect. Even if it take 
in account the formal human stakeholders of the control process, new perspectives open the 
door of a stakeholders extension with associations and population involvement (Granier, 
2009). The qualitative analysis use in this work is a bias as well. Because we only did a few 
interviews and test one software solution, results are threaten by subjectivity and have to be 
taken as a concept proof and not a globalization. Finally the actual vision stay a macroscopic 
view of the situation and a more precise case study should be conducted about a significant 
event to analyse precisely the actor network. 
Results show that the use of a management tool increases the legal requirements 
understanding (watch, compliance) and the ways of deal with it (framework and 
formalization, self-regulation). As a mainly company used tool, the platform develop the 
capacity of the OHS managers and fieldworkers to respond to the inspections demands 
(compliance). In this purpose, they use watch tools which give them an overview of present 
legal rules (laws, acts, guidelines, etc…) and futures ones (law projects, state studies, etc…). 
It lead to a better monitoring of safety management. These evolutions increase the legal 
compliance of the company and the understanding between inspectors and OHS managers 
and fieldworkers. However, as De Terssac (2003) say, we have to stay cautious about the 
effectiveness of the measures took. Focus on legal compliance can lead to a superficial safety 
management which rely on the indicators more than field reality. In the other hand, the 
platform proposes a framework which help the company to formalize its methods 
(methodologies, analysis, and organization) and insure a correct safety culture (self-
regulation initiatives, internal rules OHS organization). Despite the enthusiasm of OHS and 
corporate managers about these solutions, there are risks to overestimate their potential and 
lead to a standardization of the safety process and methods which don’t take in account 
differences between facilities. Also there is the question of the flexibility of the platform 
solution: could it adapt easily to a new legal context as current hardness legal (Pénibilité) 
questions in France? Anyway, even if there are lots of question about how collaborative 
platform can challenge the safety performance. The interest and will of the OHS managers 
and fieldworkers to come to a collaborative platform solution is a good reason to take a closer 
look to these solutions and the way to improve their efficiency. Finally, the current biggest 
question is about the involvement of inspectors in this collaborative platform use. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that while the management tool is mainly useful internally, it provides a better 
understanding of the demands of the various inspection services and therefore, initially, can 
help in compliance management. In addition, it can improve monitoring of occupational 
health and safety with respect to radiation protection management, as it offers an overview of 
both compliance and preventive actions that have been implemented (e.g. management of 
protection barriers and responses to a significant event). The limitations of the tool relate to 
excessive formalisation, which rigidifies procedures and does not take account of changes in 
the business. It is clear that an innovative and powerful tool must, above all, adapt to 
changing circumstances while remaining objective and scalable. This demonstrates the 
importance of the selection and use of management tools in nuclear safety. An avenue of 
research for future work will be to integrate State inspectors into the collaborative process. 
Another one will be to analyse through an accident case study how to improve these 
management tools and how they provide better safety prevention. 
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